The Collapse at Camden and the Horses that Shaped a Revolution
By: Wesley Faulkenberry
“Battle of Camden-Death of De Kalb. August 1780.”
Copy of engraving after Alonzo Chappel
Image courtesy of the National Archives
This year, we celebrate the 250th Anniversary of the United States of America. As part of this celebration, a more solemn task lies in remembering the hardship, sacrifice, and privations endured by the American soldiers, be they militiamen, regulars, or partisan guerillas during the struggle for independence. There is, however, another creature that endured all of this alongside them: the horse. From strong draft horses who hauled supplies and cannons to swift horses carrying messages and the horses that ferried the troopers of the cavalry into battle, horses were the backbone of the armies that won America’s independence. As it happens, one of the most decisive battles of the war was fought just a few miles from the museum: The Battle of Camden. Horses have long shaped Camden’s history, and the Revolutionary War was no exception. In addition to firing the first and last shots of the Battle of Camden, horses would help haul the equipment, evacuate the wounded, and provide a means of escape as the tides of battle turned.
Send in the Cavalry
The most popular images of horses during the Revolution are of officers like Washington, Howe, and Cornwallis astride their powerful chargers, and of the well-dressed troopers of the cavalry riding out to meet the foe. While notable, these horses were only a fraction of those who served during the Revolutionary War. The majority of horses served as draft animals, tasked with pulling the supplies of the army, the artillery it fought with, and ambulances carrying the wounded (alongside oxen and mules). Smaller, lighter, faster horses were the ones chosen for messengers to carry orders and reports between various camps, doing their best to avoid capture by the enemy which would result in horse, rider, and message falling into enemy hands.
The cavalry of the armies was responsible for far more than just fighting on the battlefield. A trooper would spend much more time in the saddle conducting patrols, reconnaissance, or guarding supplies than on a battlefield. Cavalry was also responsible for screening all marches and retreats by the army to prevent the enemy from taking them by surprise. They would also have the duty of conducting raids against the enemy’s supply lines or outposts. Partisan forces like those under Francis Marion “The Swamp Fox” or Thomas Sumter “The Carolina Gamecock”, would use horses for their hit-and-run attacks against British forces, striking quickly and then melting away into the backcountry.
During the era of horses, cavalry was divided into three general categories: light cavalry, medium cavalry, and heavy cavalry. Light cavalry, such as hussars, were issued smaller faster horses that were used for raiding, reconnaissance, and chasing down retreating foes. Heavy cavalry, like Cuirassiers, were mounted on big strong horses. They wore metal breastplates and carried heavy straight sabers. They were designed to plunge straight in and break the enemy’s line with the weight of their charge. Medium cavalry, like Dragoons, were equipped with the leftover horses that did not fit the role of either light or heavy cavalry. They fought more like mounted infantry, riding to a location before dismounting to fight on foot, but were capable fighters on horseback. While they would struggle in a straight-up fight against dedicated infantry, they were adept skirmishers and scouts and were well suited for internal policing.
The many hills, thick woods, and broken swampy ground of the American colonies combined with the expensive upkeep and limited role beyond service as shock troops meant heavy cavalry saw very little use in the American Revolution. The difficulties of transporting large numbers of horses the four thousand miles from Europe to America (at one point the British lost 500 horses in a hurricane off the coast of America) also limited the numbers of European imports. These factors meant that both sides had to use the horses that were already present in the Americas to fill out their armies. This made dragoons the unit of choice for both armies, as they could make use of almost any horse and were cheaper to maintain than light or heavy cavalry.
The Marsh Tacky
Both Patriot and Loyalist troops often provided their own horses for their mounts. As the armies marched and conducted their operations, they regularly “confiscated” (stole) horses and other stock from the local communities. Lucky citizens would be paid in gold for their confiscated goods, but more often than not would receive nothing more than an I.O.U. It was this reliance on local horses that gave the Carolina Marsh Tacky its place in American history.
The Marsh Tacky is descended from the horses brought by the Spanish Conquistadors for their expeditions in the Americas. At the end of their journeys, the Spanish would turn their horses loose, not wanting to deal with the trials of bringing them back across the Atlantic, allowing them to begin new lives in the Americas. These horses began to adapt to the swampy low country, and by the time of the Revolution lived in feral packs across the Carolinas and Georgia. Marsh Tackies were used by the colonists on an as-needed basis. When needed, the horses would be rounded up and put to work, then released when the work was completed. They were easy keepers, able to subsist on marsh grasses, and were excellent at navigating the swamps of the low country. It was these traits that made the horses so valuable to Francis Marion and his partisans and allowed them to evade the British. British attempts to chase Marion and his partisans back through their home turf often ended with British horses stuck in the mud and unable to pursue. The needs of British horses, usually descended from hot-blooded breeds like Arabians, required the British to maintain stocks of oats and grains. The partisans allowed their Marsh Tackies to graze around the camp between operations. They sustained themselves on the plentiful marsh grasses, a trait that was invaluable to forces with no formal supply lines. Marion himself was reported to have captured the Marsh Tacky belonging to a Loyalist Col. John Cummins Ball, and used the horse, appropriately named Ball, for the remainder of the war.
Marsh Tackies would be called into action again in the 1940s when they were used to patrol beaches during World War II. The Marsh Tacky was believed to have gone extinct in the 1980s and 1990s, but the low country swamps were still home to the resilient little breed. Today, the Carolina Marsh Tacky Association is working to ensure the survival of the breed, of which a few hundred still exist.
The Southern Theater
After three years of war the British war effort had gained surprisingly little ground, and was in a worse place than when it started. While they had successfully repulsed American invasions of Canada and had seized New York City and Philadelphia, though they abandoned the latter shortly after, the crushing defeat at Saratoga in 1777 had compelled the French and then the Spanish to throw their lot in with the American rebels. What had begun as a rebellion of the American colonies had now become a threat to Britain and her Empire and was sucking in more men and money to protect and preserve it. Furthermore, there was no overall strategy for how to restore British rule in the colonies. Some voices were even calling for New England, the birthplace of the rebellion, to be abandoned.
It is from this background that the focus of the British shifted south. The British Army decided to launch a new campaign in the Southern colonies of Georgia and the Carolinas from their bases in Florida. The British believed that Loyalist support was higher in these colonies and would allow for easy victories and an ample garrison of loyal militia units to maintain compliance while the British marched north to trap the rebels between the jaws of two advancing British armies. Thus, they would sweep the rebels from the Southern colonies and trap them in the Chesapeake, where they could be destroyed. With order restored in the Southern and Mid-Atlantic colonies, they would then be able to focus on New England. However, the reports of loyalism in the Southern colonies were exaggerated by Loyalist exiles in London. Desiring the return of their lands, and seeking rewards for their loyalty, they fed British officials a steady stream of reports overstating loyalty to the crown in the South in hopes of spurring on British military operations in those colonies.
In December 1779, the British Army seized Savannah, Georgia to use as their base of operations in the South. From Savannah they struck against Charleston, South Carolina twice in 1780, but were repulsed both times while succeeding in defending Savannah against a joint Franco-American effort to retake it. In March 1780, General Sir Henry Clinton, Commander-In-Chief of British forces in America, launched a naval blockade of Charleston and massed some 10,000 troops to lay siege to the city. Lieutenant Colonel Bansatre Tarleton, and his cavalry tightened the noose by closing off the supply and escape routes on the north side of Charleston. The British siege broke the defenders and nearly 5,000 American troops under Major General Benjamin Lincoln were compelled to surrender to Clinton in May 1780. A short time later, the British occupied Camden and began to use it as their main hub for operations in the backcountry.
The Journey to Camden
With the fall of Charleston, American military presence in the South hovered around non-existence. Congress authorized a new army to be raised under the command of Major General Horatio Gates, the Hero of Saratoga, to retake Charleston and South Carolina. While today Gates holds a (largely self-inflicted) poor reputation, he was a talented administrator whose contributions to the victories at Saratoga were invaluable. However, his strategic and tactical thinking were limited. George Washington dispatched two of his stoutest fighting units, the Maryland Line and the Delaware Line, approximately 1500 men, under the command of Major General Johann, the Baron de Kalb to form the basis of this new army.
The men of the Maryland Line and Delaware Line were regular soldiers, usually referred to as Continentals on the American side; with British regulars called Redcoats. These men received standardized uniforms and equipment and extensive training and drill to maintain a high degree of fighting ability. They were also expected to go wherever they were ordered to, often far beyond the confines of their homes. These regulars are contrasted by the militia with which they fought side-by-side. Militiamen were not professional soldiers, but were expected to help defend their local communities in the event of a threat. Because they were not professionals, they wore whatever clothes they had on hand and with whatever weapons were available. The degree of training and drill they received depended almost entirely on the officers in command of them. They could be of great benefit in their home regions owing to their knowledge of the local land, but their effectiveness waned the farther from home they went. Because of these factors, militia units on both sides were often unreliable, but when well led and trained performed valuable service.
De Kalb and his Continentals marched out of their camp in New Jersey on April 16, 1780. Things got off to an inauspicious start when they were required to leave ten of their eighteen allotted cannons behind due to a lack of horses. By July, they were thirty miles south of Greensboro but badly fatigued and short of rations. General Gates arrived and brought with him a few hundred militia from Virginia. Despite the lack of food, Gates ordered the army to march along the main road to Camden. His officers presented a different plan: to operate west of Camden in a more friendly country where they might find more supplies. But Gates did not heed them. This time, it was the Americans who had fallen victim to overly optimistic reports of local support and the weakness of the garrison of Camden.
So, the men and horses of Gates’ army plodded onwards, their supply situation growing worse each day. They subsisted on green corn, green apples, and green peaches. At each stop rations and rum were promised, but never materialized. The men teetered on the brink of mutiny, but assured by their officers that they were sharing in their privations, endured. On August 7, General Richard Caswell arrived with 2,100 North Carolina militiamen. But these reinforcements did little to alleviate their supply problems.
Around this time, Colonel William Washington arrived with two regiments of dragoons at his command. Gates turned them away telling Col. Washington that he did not think cavalry would be of much use in the South. Francis Marion arrived a short time later, and likewise was sent away. Thomas Sumter, however, got Gates’ attention. The two never met, but Sumter sent a letter outlining a strategy of cutting off supplies to Camden and requested troops from Gates’ command to achieve his goals. He supported his plans with intelligence that was both faulty and too optimistic. Even so, Gates accepted and detached 100 Maryland Continentals, 300 North Carolina militia, and two cannons to Sumter. Because of these decisions, Gates had only around 130 cavalrymen to perform all of the duties outlined earlier.
All of these factors combine to create a picture in light of which it is very difficult to defend General Gates. That he was out of his depth is beyond question, but the decisions, though questionable, do shed light on Gates’ overall strategy. Gates needed to take the strategic offensive to raise Patriot morale, but knew his army was not capable of fighting a tactical offensive. With this in mind, he planned to move his army to within a few miles of Camden and entrench, daring the British to attack him. Proof of his plan is offered by the fact that he ordered two of his engineers to go ahead of the army to scout the ground near Camden and find suitable ground for defensive works. As Gates’ army dug in, Thomas Sumter would encircle Camden to the west, and Francis Marion to the east, threatening their rear and lines of supply and communication. The British would be forced to either attack Gates on ground of his choosing with his numerically superior forces dug in, abandon Camden and escape to the South, or surrender to Gates. With luck, he could take Camden without firing a shot. With this view, it is understandable why Gates so neglected his cavalry, as it would be of little use behind entrenchments, and he could rely on Sumter and Marion for intelligence. Gates’ choice of camp was also poor. While Rugeley’s Mill was only a day’s march from Camden, that math works in both directions. Because of his lack of cavalry, a swift force marching from Camden could reach Gates and his army before they had time to respond. A camp further away would give him time and space to maneuver in the face of a British advance.
The King’s Regulars March
As the saying goes, however, no plan survives contact with the enemy. Gates’ plan required the British to play their part like an actor in a script, and Lieutenant General Charles, Lord Cornwallis had no intention of playing his assigned role. After the fall of Charleston, Clinton had returned to New York and left Cornwallis to handle the Southern theater. In this role, he had largely been relegated to playing administrator and politics and despised these jobs. When, on August 9, he received Lord Rawdon’s dispatch from Camden that Gates was marching against him with an army of 5,000 men, Cornwallis saw his chance and left behind the problems of Charleston and set off at once. Executing a forced march, he reached Camden by the evening of August 13 and began to make his preparations.
Cornwallis’ muster returned 2,239 men present and ready for combat. Though outnumbered by Gates’ army, Cornwallis had a decided advantage in regular infantry. The core of his army was the Thirty-Third (West Ridings) Regiment of Foot, the Twenty-Third (Royal Welsh Fusiliers) Regiment of Foot, and five companies of Highlanders from the Seventy-First (Fraser’s Highlanders) Regiment of Foot. These men were well equipped, highly disciplined, battle hardened, and the equals of any fighting force in the world. They were supported by Lord Rawdon’s Regiment of Ireland, and militia and light infantry from North Carolina. Though they had only four cannons, they also had 180 dragoons of the British Legion led by the much-feared Lt. Colonel Banastre Tarleton, who, according to Patriot propaganda, a few months earlier had massacred surrendering American troops at the Battle of Waxhaws.
With hindsight and the totality of the victory, it is easy to look back at the outcome of the Battle of Camden and say that Cornwallis’ victory was all but assured before the armies ever met. It is important to remember that those engaged possessed no such foresight. The British under Cornwallis went into battle with confidence, but also with an understanding that they were outnumbered, possibly as much as two to one, and that each man would have to do his utmost to secure victory.
Cornwallis, on arrival at Camden, mustered his men and offered a short speech. “Now, my brave soldiers, now an opportunity is offered for displaying your valour, and sustaining the glory of British arms; -all you who are willing to face your enemies; -all you who are ambitious of military fame stand forward; for there are eight or ten to one coming against: -Let the man who cannot bear to smell gun-powder stand back, and all you who are determined to conquer or die turn out.” His words had the desired effect on his men, as all turned out with only a few being left behind to guard the garrison’s supplies and sick. An anonymous officer, probably an American Loyalist, echoed Cornwallis’ words in a letter that was published after the battle in the Royal Gazette: “Every officer and soldier was determined to conquer or die.”
Horses Go Bump in the Night
By sheer coincidence, both Cornwallis and Gates proposed the same plan: a night march along the main road, beneath the light of a full moon, to surprise the enemy in the morning. Cornwallis knew from Rawdon that Gates’ army was camped by Rugeley’s Mill and planned for a night march to surprise the Americans there and take them in an early morning attack. Gates intended for his army to conduct a night march to reach a position five-and-a-half miles north of Camden where they would entrench.
Both Generals issued their orders for their army to set out at 10pm on August 15, 1780. Cornwallis’ battle-tested regulars had no trouble executing these orders. Gates and his army had considerably more difficulty with them. The majority of his force was militia who had never had to coordinate themselves among large numbers of other troops. They had to perform all of this with little training and during the night. Matters were further complicated when the men’s evening meal included a gill of molasses. This acted as a purgative for the men, causing countless men to fall out of formation, and further weakened Gates’ raw army.
As was common, both sides had their cavalry leading the way. Armand’s Legion guided the Americans while Cornwallis’ army followed Tarleton’s British Legion. Curiously, Col. Armand protested this arrangement. He argued to Gates that a night attack should not be led by horses, as their hooves can be heard at a great distance. Gates ignored his protests, probably because he knew this was not an attack. If Tarleton had any similar complaints, they were not recorded.
Around 2:00 am on August 16, 1780 the vanguards of the two armies collided, in some cases literally, in the darkness. Confusion reigned as the night was illuminated by the muzzle flashes of pistols set to a soundtrack of confused cries of man and beast. Armand’s Legion was driven back by Tarleton’s dragoons and caused confusion in the leading infantry elements. Virginia militia under Lt. Col. Charles Porterfield moved up and the clatter of musketry drove the British Legion back. Neither side pursued and began to try to figure out what had happened. From prisoners each commander learned that the whole enemy army was just a few hundred yards away.
The news did little to change Cornwallis’ plan, and he began to form his troops in the dark to prepare them for a morning attack. Gates, however, was visibly shocked when he learned of the proximity of the British army. He had never intended to fight a general engagement against the whole of the British Army, yet now that prospect was staring him in the face. He called a council of war with his generals and communicated the “unwelcome news” to them and asked “Gentlemen, what is best to be done?” The army’s second in command, de Kalb, had been opposed to any offensive action, but said nothing at this juncture. Brigadier General Edward Stevens of Virginia declared “Gentlemen, is it not too late now to do anything but fight?” No one raised any concerns or objections and the officers dispersed to join their commands and prepare for the fight.
Even had concerns been voiced, it is unlikely to have changed the fate of Gates’ army much. Because of his neglect, the British had a superiority in cavalry. With the armies already in such close proximity, it is doubtful that the American cavalry, already outnumbered, could have held back the British Army long enough to allow the Americans to escape. Any attempted extradition would have almost certainly required the abandonment of the baggage train and heavy equipment to allow for speedy flight, leaving the army in an even worse state than it already was. (Gates issued orders that night for the baggage to begin moving back towards Rugeley’s Mill but for unknown reasons they were not followed). The difficulties of marching little drilled militia would have been amplified by Tarleton’s dragoons at their heels and have high potential to devolve into a rout. Furthermore, the morale consequences of retreating at the first sign of the enemy, rendering their earlier efforts meaningless, may have pushed the already dispirited army over the edge. In short, through lack of planning, foresight, and naivete Gates had led his army into a no-win scenario.
Even at this late hour, as dire as things were, a crushing American defeat was not yet assured. Tired and ill as they were, de Kalb’s Continentals were still hardened fighters, and capable of going muzzle-to-muzzle with Cornwallis’ Redcoats. With proper deployment of troops and planning for the confrontation that would come at first light, Gates may have averted such a severe crisis and survived to withdraw from the field in some semblance of order. However, there is no evidence that Gates put any serious thought into his dispositions for the battle, and appears to have had no real plan.
Battle Lines Form
The armies began to form before dawn. The Americans deployed in a line with de Kalb and his Continentals on the right side of the Waxhaws Road with the Second Maryland Brigade and the Delaware Regiment with the First Maryland Brigade in reserve. To their left was Caswell’s 1800 North Carolina militia and on their left were the 700 Virginia militiamen of Edward Stevens. Armand’s 120 horse and foot soldiers were behind the Virginians in support. The American’s eight cannon were placed at various points around the line. Gates and his staff were 200 yards behind the battle line.
Cornwallis deployed his troops in much the same way. He set Lord Rawdon and his militia on the left side of the road, across from the Continentals, and deployed his Redcoats to the right of them, with his four cannons astride the road. The Highlanders posted one battalion on each side of the road for support, while Tarleton and his dragoons stood in column as a reserve behind the line.
Both generals’ deployments were so similar for two reasons. First, the ground was bounded on either side by swamps. There would be no chance to outflank or outmaneuver. This would be a straight-up battle. Second, both deployed their army in the standard European way, with the senior troops on the right of the line. This deployment meant that Gates’ untried militia would be left face-to-face with Cornwallis’ best units, his Redcoats. Gates must have been aware of this fact. In private he gave the large number of untrained militiamen in his army as a reason why he did not wish to fight. Yet, when he made his deployment, he appears to have paid this fact no mind.
As dawn broke on August 16, the heat of the previous day lingered. The air was still and heavy with humidity. Cornwallis ordered his regiments to advance in column and close the distance between the armies before they would form into line. Col. Otho Holland Williams, Adjutant General to the Baron de Kalb, ordered the American cannons to open fire. In a matter of minutes, the woods came alive with the angry buzzing of case shot as the American guns opened up on the British infantry and Cornwallis’ guns returned their fire. Williams then rode back to Gates and apprised him of the situation. He suggested that Stevens’ Virginia militiamen might advance and catch the British before they formed into line, and thus catch them before they were able to bring all their guns to bear. Gates agreed and sent Williams with the orders. Gates sent Thomas Pinckney to de Kalb ordering him to attack as well.
Had these orders been given and executed by experienced troops in expedient fashion, they might well have blunted Cornwallis’ attack. Instead, owing to the fact that Gates was 200 yards behind the line, they arrived after the British had already gone into line. Even so, the Virginians advanced to meet the Redcoats.
Again, it bears mention that the outcome of the battle was very much unknown to its participants in this early stage. An officer of the British light infantry, advancing at Camden wrote of his part in the battle:
“I assure you it was a little farcical to see us drawn up against 7000 men, who appeared formidable; I had not an idea of surviving an instant after their first volley; but our little body regardless of their numbers, and with their usual bravery and undauntedness, gave a screech, that made the woods and vallies[sic] re-echo, and dashed with their bayonnets[sic] into the center of them, as lions and tygers[sic] do at their prey. The miscreants not accustomed to this method of fighting, fled before us…”
William Gipson of the North Carolina militia recalled his involvement when he applied for a veteran’s pension in 1832:
“I was among the nearest to the enemy… we had orders to wait for the word to commence firing; that the militia were in front and in a feeble condition at that time. They were fatigued. The weather was warm excessively. They had been fed a short time previously on molasses entirely. I can state on oath that I believe my gun was the first gun fired, notwithstanding the orders, for we were close to the enemy, who appeared to maneuver in contempt of us, and I fired without thinking except that I might prevent the man opposite from killing me. The discharge and loud roar soon became general from one end of the lines to the other. Amongst other things, I confess I was amongst the first that fled. The cause of that I cannot tell, except that everyone I saw was about to do the same. It was instantaneous. There was no effort to rally, no encouragement to fight. Officers and men joined in the flight.”
As the Virginia militia advanced to meet the Redcoats’ advance, Stevens ordered them to fix bayonets and prepare to meet the enemy. The men had only been issued these strange attachments a few days ago, and had never even drilled with them. As they watched the British advance, the Virginians declined the order to fix bayonets, threw down their loaded weapons, and fled. In short order, the North Carolinians, save for one unit, followed suit and joined the retreat. Armand’s Legion, posted behind the line, also joined in the flight of the infantry, adding the thunder of the cavalry to the procession. The horsemen stopped only to plunder the Americans’ own baggage, making no effort to protect the retreat. In a matter of minutes, the American left had collapsed utterly.
De Kalb Holds Fast
On the other side of the field, de Kalb and his Continentals, along with one unit of North Carolina militia pounced upon Rawdon’s regiments. What they knew of the collapse of their left is debatable. Otho Williams claimed that their experience and discipline left them unfazed by the collapse. It’s more likely that they did not know the extent of what had happened. Black powder muskets and cannons produce an enormous amount of smoke and there was no wind that morning. With the choking clouds of smoke and haze obscuring the battlefield, it is likely they never saw the militia run.
The Continentals unleashed their pent-up fury at weeks of poor supply and hard marching upon Rawdon’s men. The Volunteers of Ireland attacked them twice and were repulsed both times. Then the infantry of the British Legion came at them, and again the British were thrown back in disorder. Now, de Kalb ordered a counter attack, and drove Rawdon’s line in at the point of the bayonet, taking prisoners along the way. At this point, the British left began to buckle under the American onslaught.
Here Cornwallis rode to the front on horseback, and in the thickest fighting, steadied his men by personal bravery and appeals to those soldierly virtues of courage, duty, and honor. Rawdon’s men began to stabilize, but they needed help.
It arrived in the form of the Redcoats that had just put the American left to flight. Rather than chase the fleeing militia, they wheeled about and came down on the flank of de Kalb and his Continentals. The brunt of this attack fell on a regiment of North Carolina militiamen under Lt. Col. Henry Dixon. However, unlike the other militia units, the North Carolinians stood their ground and blazed away at the British regulars.
Sergeant Roger Lamb of the Twenty-Third Regiment of Foot recorded in his memoirs “In justice to the North Carolina militia, it should be remarked, that part of the brigade commanded by General Gregory acquitted themselves well; they… kept the field while they had a cartridge to fire… and many of his brigade who were made prisoners had no wound except from bayonet.”
In spite of this gallant stand, de Kalb’s position was growing more dire by the minute. He was now outnumbered and outflanked. Already wounded and personally involved in the heavy fighting, his aides begged him to retire as they attempted to dress his wounds. He refused to leave the field. He still believed victory was at hand. In the fog of war, he seemed unaware of the disaster that had unfolded to his left. De Kalb ordered Gen. Smallwood’s First Maryland Brigade to move up from their reserve position to his left flank, then went back in to join the combat.
The Marylanders pressed forward and delivered a galling fire into the Redcoats, stopping their attack cold and forcing them back. However, the battle-hardened British dressed their line and returned the Marylanders’ fire, preventing them from linking up with de Kalb’s hard-pressed line.
At this point, the battle reached a momentary equilibrium. The British advance had been checked, the grand sweeping movements reduced to exchange of volleys and ferocious hand-to-hand fighting. The British infantry, for the moment, had been checked. The American position, however, was extremely dire. Despite their valiant efforts, the First Maryland could not advance and link up with the North Carolina militia on de Kalb’s left, being driven back at great cost with every attempt. Both American lines were threatened by a dangerous gap of nearly 200 yards between them leaving both flanks of the First Maryland exposed, and de Kalb’s left exposed. The Americans were outnumbered and outflanked, and now even the steadfast Continentals began to waver.
Cornwallis’ Coup de Grâce
Cornwallis sensed that victory was near. He ordered Tarleton and his Legion to take the Americans from the rear. Tarleton led his troopers through the gap between the American lines where they split into two parties. Then, each came down into the rear of the two American lines. Finally, the gallant men of Maryland, Delaware, and North Carolina could stand no more. The last fighting units of Gates’ army collapsed into a total rout. The soldiers fled for their lives and abandoned all military discipline. Armand’s Legion made a final stand at Rugeley’s Mill and tried to slow the British cavalry, but were driven off. Tarleton and his dragoons chased the Americans for twenty-two miles, slashing them down as they did, before exhaustion ended the chase around Hanging Rock. As Tarleton reported, “Rout and slaughter ensued in every quarter.” The only American unit to leave the field in some semblance of order was a party of 100 Continentals under Brigadier General Mordecai Gist who waded through a swamp on the American right where Tarleton’s horses could not chase them. The whole affair lasted less than an hour.
Astute readers will note that Gen. Gates disappeared from this narrative right as the battle was being joined. We last saw him ordering the American advance and have heard no more of the Hero of Saratoga. The reason for this is simple, after ordering the attack, Gates played no further role in the Battle of Camden. As the militia fled by him, Gates mounted his charger, a son of the Thoroughbred Fearnaught, and fled with them. His most notable feat of the battle was his horsemanship which allowed him to cover the sixty miles from the battlefield to Charlotte, North Carolina by sundown. Two more days later, he was back in Hillsborough, having covered 180 miles in three days. He claimed that he was trying to rally the militia, but his claims become harder to believe as he rides further and further away from the battlefield. He was removed from command in total disgrace, and today enjoys a reputation in America only slightly higher than Benedict Arnold.
The Cost of Camden
Because of the totality of the American defeat, casualty numbers have always been difficult to discern. Cornwallis reported taking about 1000 prisoners, many of whom were wounded, seven cannons, and estimated that between 800 and 900 Americans were killed, which is almost certainly an overestimation. Modern estimates put the American dead at around 250 killed with 800 wounded, many of whom became prisoners. The majority of those killed were among de Kalb’s Continentals and Dixon’s North Carolina militia. The Virginia militia had fled so quickly that they suffered a paltry three wounded as casualties and would not stop running until they reached Hillsborough, North Carolina, some 180 miles away. What discussion was had between these troops and their commander upon arrival at Hillsborough, if any, was not recorded. General Gist and his Continentals would not reach Hillsborough until September 4.
Lord Cornwallis reports British losses at 68 killed, 245 wounded, and 11 missing for a total of 324 casualties. This represents almost fifteen percent of the British troops engaged, and serves as a testament to the tenacity of de Kalb and his Continentals and the North Carolina militia that held their ground with them. Cornwallis reported “The loss of so many brave men is to be lamented; but the number is moderate in proportion to so great an advantage.”
One of the few casualties whose status is well-recorded is that of the Baron de Kalb. As Gates and the militia fled, de Kalb stood by his Continentals in the thick of the fight. His horse was killed under him, and he rose and continued to fight. Even as the situation deteriorated, de Kalb, though suffering grievous wounds, fought on. He cut down a British soldier with his own saber as the man bayoneted him in the chest before he finally collapsed under the weight of eleven wounds from musket balls, bayonets, and sabers. British troops, in the heat of battle, began to bayonet the collapsed figure. His aide, Chevalier de Buysson, threw himself on top of his commander, absorbed the bayonets with his own body, and cried out his name and rank in an effort to spare him and brought the British troops to their senses. It’s reported some troops began to strip him of his fabulous gold laced coat, but their officers put a quick stop to the behavior. He was carried from the field by the British, where he was met by Cornwallis. Lord Cornwallis is reported to have said “I am sorry, sir, to see you, not sorry that you are vanquished, but sorry to see you so badly wounded.” Cornwallis then supervised as his personal surgeon dressed de Kalb’s wounds. Tarleton reported that de Kalb refused to accept that Gates had fled the field and that they had been defeated. He had been so confident in the efforts of his troops that he felt they would surely be the victors.
The dying de Kalb was taken back to Camden, where he lingered until he died of his wounds on August 19. His last words were reported to be: “I thank you sir for your generous sympathy, but I die the death I always prayed for: the death of a soldier fighting for the rights of man.” In truth it is unlikely, he said anything of such length or depth. He must have been in utter agony as he lay dying of his numerous wounds in a hot South Carolina summer. Historian John Buchanan offered a succinct contrast of the conduct of the two principal American commanders: “It took Gates three days to reach Hillsborough. It took de Kalb three days to die.”
Heroic Horses
Among the chaos, confusion, death, and destruction of the Battle of Camden there were also tales of great heroism and bravery. The valiant stand of de Kalb’s Continentals and the cool composure of the British Redcoats was often mirrored by the horses on each side. De Kalb’s own horse was killed during the fighting, sharing the fate of his master. Tarleton’s horses showed their stamina and skill as they carried their riders through the mass of humanity during the rout of the American army. Among the panic of the retreat were the hundreds of draft horses who had carried the army’s supplies and baggage. Fleeing soldiers released the horses from their harnesses, then used them to aid in their own escape. While this may have helped individuals to flee the battlefield, it left the heavy equipment for the British to take after the battle.
Col. Otho Williams escaped the battlefield, and credited his safe passage to his horse. He also complimented his horses’ coolness under fire. Three months after the battle, he wrote to his sister:
“My gay old Friend Liberty is as bold as Bucephalus[Alexander the Great’s horse], he behaved so gallantly in action that I was confident of my security from ever thing but [musket] Balls – An Officer of the British Army was ungenerous enough to direct the fire of his Platoon particularly at him, but as I was lucky enough to see and hear him at the instant he gave the work and pointed with his Sword, I hastily chang’d my situation and escaped by crossing the line.”
Guilford Dudley was an aide to Col. Porterfield of the North Carolina militia and was with him when the lead elements of the armies collided that night. As Tarleton’s dragoons got the better of Armand’s, it was Porterfield’s troops who were called on to halt the British advance. Dudley was beside Porterfield when he was seriously wounded and thrown from his horse, who was also wounded. Dudley did his best to help his wounded Colonel onto his own horse, and with the assistance of two other soldiers was able to evacuate Porterfield to the care of the army’s surgeons. Despite their best efforts, Porterfield died of the wounds he sustained on the Camden battlefield.
Of Cavalry and Consequences
With Gates’ defeat at the Battle of Camden the American army in the South had been destroyed for the second time in three months. Of the original 4000 who had assembled at Hillsborough in July, less than 700 returned, and almost none of them Continental regulars. The whole of the South seemed to be at the mercy of the British crown, and the revolution itself in danger. It would be December before Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene took command of the ragged army and began to re-form it. Until then, the fate of the South lay in the hands of the partisans like Francis Marion and Thomas Sumter.
The Battle of Camden was decided long before the troopers of Tarleton and Armand bumped into each other after midnight on August 16. One of the key factors in this was Gates’ mismanagement of his troops, and particularly his cavalry. Had he made better use of cavalry, he might have detected Cornwallis’ march before he was caught in a scenario where he had to fight a pitched battle against very long odds. Cavalry proved to be the decisive weapon on the Camden battlefield, as Tarleton’s dragoons were the ones who put the last Americans to flight and then chased them down, furthering casualties and confusion as they went. This ensured that the Americans had no chance to reform their army. The American cavalry fled as soon as battle was joined and played only a slight role in protecting the advance and then retreat. Now, as we look back across 250 years of America and we honor the sacrifices of the fighting men, let’s remember not just them, but the noble beasts that aided them on the road to independence.
Graves of twelve unidentified American dead from the Battle of Camden
